Ongoing Challenges Limit U.S. Agroterrorism Response Capabilities

The nation still faces complex challenges which limit its ability to respond effectively to an attack against livestock, said a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

WASHINGTON, D.C. – While much has been done since 2001 to protect U.S. agriculture from a terrorist attack, the nation still faces complex challenges which limit its ability to respond effectively to an attack against livestock, said a recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

 

The report provided the findings of a study conducted to address the increased concerns about the vulnerability of the U.S.’s annual $1 trillion agriculture industry. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001 and government officials’ increasing recognition of the need to reduce agriculture’s vulnerability to deliberate introduction of animal or plant diseases, agroterrorism has received increased attention. In the study, GAO examined the federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities to protect against agroterrorism; the steps that agencies have taken to manage the risks; and the challenges and problems that remain.

 

Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, the report notes, federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities have been modified to help protect agriculture. In addition, agencies are coordinating development of plans and protocols to increase terrorism response capabilities and conducting exercises to test the protocols and capabilities; have conducted vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant and human diseases; have begun development of a national veterinary stockpile including vaccines against foreign animal diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture sector.

 

Despite these initiatives, the report acknowledges that several important challenges still need to be addressed to better equip the U.S. to manage agroterrorism, including an inability to quickly identify and control foreign animal diseases and a reduction in port-of-entry inspections of agricultural products since the 2003 transfer of agricultural inspectors from USDA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

 

From its findings, GAO has recommended that USDA examine the costs and benefits of developing stockpiles of ready-to-use vaccines, and that DHS and USDA determine the reasons for declining agricultural inspections. The report also includes a statement that USDA, DHS and Health and Human Services (HHS) generally agreed with its recommendations, while the Department of Defense (DOD) and Environmental Protection Agency made technical comments but took no position on the report’s recommendations.